Abstract Recent contributions to the economics of terrorism have given contradicting recommendations for campaigning against terrorism, from the proposal to deprive terrorists of their resources to the proposal of raising the opportunity costs of terrorism by increasing the wealth of the affected regions. Within a simple framework which differentiates between the decision to become an active terrorist and the decision to support terrorists and which allows for reciprocal reactions to anti-terrorism policies, it is argued here that undifferentiated deterrence may indeed backfire, but so may an increase of the opportunity costs of terrorism. A very targeted anti-terrorism policy aimed only at active terrorists would then be the most reasonable remaining approach.
Introduction
There is a large number of economic approaches to the problem of terrorism that treat the individual decision to engage in terrorist activities as a rational choice calculus, which is largely in line with empirical evidence. For example, the data show that terrorist activities decrease with the severity and likelihood of prison sentences and with the effectiveness of the technology used to prevent terrorist acts (Landes, 1978) . And even if one is not willing to attribute individual rationality to each and every suicide bomber, one can still argue that the leaders of terrorist groups who guide and encourage the suicide bombers are rational individuals, so that the phenomenon of terrorism as a whole remains a reasonable subject for rational choice approaches (Rathbone & Rowley, 2002 Sandler and Enders (2004, p. 302 ) define terrorism as "the premeditated use, or threat of use, of extranormal violence to obtain a political objective through intimidation or fear directed at a large audience". Until recently, there appears to have been a consensus that the political objectives that are assumed to appear in the utility function of terrorists are more or less "constructive" goals, such as establishing political independence for a region or an ethnic group, demanding the release of fellow terrorists from imprisonment, or promoting one's own faith and ideology. If that is the case and terrorists are indeed rational, the amount of terrorist activity conducted by one specific group may be reduced by seeking a political compromise with that group -although, of course, the problem exists that in the longer run terrorism may then be perceived as a feasible strategy by other political groups, which again would lead to an increase of terrorist activities. In conflicts such as the struggle between Irish republican catholics and protestant Ulster loyalists, the attempt to decrease terrorist activity by seeking political compromise has certainly led to a decline of terrorist activity.
On the other hand, the kidnapping of German politician Peter Lorenz by the Red Army Fraction in 1975, which has been peacefully resolved by exchanging Lorenz for imprisoned members of the terrorist group, is an example for a compromise that has motivated further attempts by terrorists to emulate this once-successful strategy. This is consistent with the game-theoretic insight that only a strict non-negotiating policy will deter terrorists from attempting extortions (Lapan & Sandler, 1988; Sandler, Tschirhart & Cauley, 1983; Selten, 1988) and only in the case that attempting extortion does not involve other sources of utility, e.g. a reputational utility from publicly decapitating the hostage if negotations fail.
Recently, the argument has been made by different non-economist authors that Islamic terrorism as we observe it today is not directed at enforcing "constructive" goals, but rather of a purely destructive or nihilist nature. This paper therefore differs from other recent contributions to the economics of terrorism in assuming that there is a kind of terrorism which is not undertaken to achieve feasible political goals through extortion (as recently assumed by Frey and Luechinger, 2003, as well as Konrad, 2002 ) but which aims purely at producing damage to a perceived enemy, or as Plaut (2004) puts it: "terrorists seek to achieve the annihilation of their targets, not a negotiated solution". Section 2 argues that the phenomenon of nihilist terrorism is indeed of empirical relevance, and not only with regard to Islamist terrorism. In Section 3 it is argued that efforts to seek political compromise with nihilist terrorists or to increase the value of their outside option through wealth transfers to an affected region are likely to be futile or even counter-productive. In Section 4, however, an argument based upon the economics of reciprocity is made that conventional deterrence against terrorists does also have the potential to evoke an increase of nihilist terrorism. Finally, Section 5 offers some conclusions.
Nihilism as a feature of terrorist activity
The Merriam Webster dictionary defines nihilism as a "doctrine or belief that conditions in the social organization are so bad as to make destruction desirable for its own sake independent of any constructive program or possibility". But can the seemingly uncompromised taste for destruction shared, for example, by suicide bombers really be attributed to nihilism or is the terrorist act merely an instrument to achieve other, constructive purposes? For instance, Bernholz (2004) has introduced the notion of supreme values into the economic discussion of terrorism and argues that terrorists tend to have lexicographic preferences which make them willing to sacrifice even their life in order to achieve their primary purpose. There does, however, exist the problem that terrorist acts often are ill-suited to achieve the primary purposes that are usually attributed to individuals who engage in terrorist activity.
